



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20231
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FEB 10 2003

In re

:
: DECISION ON
: PETITION FOR REGRADE
: UNDER 37 CFR 10.7(c)
:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(petitioner) petitions for regrading his answers to questions 8, 12, 15, 24 and 32 of the morning section and questions 12 and 22 of the afternoon section of the Registration Examination held on April 17, 2002. The petition is denied to the extent petitioner seeks a passing grade on the Registration Examination.

BACKGROUND

An applicant for registration to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in patent cases must achieve a passing grade of 70 in both the morning and afternoon sections of the Registration Examination. Petitioner scored 68. On July 30, 2002, petitioner requested regrading, arguing that the model answers were incorrect.

As indicated in the instructions for requesting regrading of the Examination, in order to expedite a petitioner's appeal rights, a single final agency decision will be made

regarding each request for regrade. The decision will be reviewable under 35 U.S.C. § 32. The Director of the USPTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) and 37 CFR 10.2 and 10.7, has delegated the authority to decide requests for regrade to the Director of Patent Legal Administration.

OPINION

Under 37 CFR 10.7(c), petitioner must establish any errors that occurred in the grading of the Examination. The directions state: " No points will be awarded for incorrect answers or unanswered questions." The burden is on petitioners to show that their chosen answers are the most correct answers.

The directions to the morning and afternoon sections state in part:

Do not assume any additional facts not presented in the questions. When answering each question, unless otherwise stated, assume that you are a registered patent practitioner. The most correct answer is the policy, practice, and procedure which must, shall, or should be followed in accordance with the U.S. patent statutes, the USPTO rules of practice and procedure, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) articles and rules, unless modified by a court decision, a notice in the Official Gazette, or a notice in the Federal Register. There is only one most correct answer for each question. Where choices (A) through (D) are correct and choice (E) is "All of the above," the last choice (E) will be the most correct answer and the only answer which will be accepted. Where two or more choices are correct, the most correct answer is the answer that refers to each and every one of the correct choices. Where a question includes a statement with one or more blanks or ends with a colon, select the

answer from the choices given to complete the statement which would make the statement true. Unless otherwise explicitly stated, all references to patents or applications are to be understood as being U.S. patents or regular (non-provisional) utility applications for utility inventions only, as opposed to plant or design applications for plant and design inventions. Where the terms “USPTO” or “Office” are used in this examination, they mean the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Petitioner has presented various arguments attacking the validity of the model answers. All of petitioner's arguments have been fully considered. Each question in the Examination is worth one point.

Petitioner has been awarded an additional point for morning question 12. Accordingly, petitioner has been granted an additional point on the Examination. No credit has been awarded for morning questions 8, 15, 24 and 32 and afternoon questions 12 and 22. Petitioner's arguments for these questions are addressed individually below.

Morning question 8 reads as follows:

8. On March 20, 2000, Patsy Practitioner filed a patent application on widget Y for the ABC Company based on a patent application filed in Germany for which benefit of priority was claimed. The sole inventor of widget Y is Clark. On September 13, 2000, Patsy received a first Office action on the merits rejecting all the claims of widget Y under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Jones in view of Smith. When reviewing the Jones reference, Patsy notices that the assignee is the ABC Company, that the Jones patent application was filed on April 3, 1999, and that the Jones patent was granted on January 24, 2000. Jones does not claim the same patentable invention as Clark's patent application on widget Y. Patsy wants to overcome the rejection without amending the claims. Which of the following replies independently of the other replies would not be in accordance with proper USPTO practice and procedures?

(A) A reply traversing the rejection by correctly arguing that Jones in view of Smith fails to teach widget Y as claimed, and specifically and correctly pointing out claimed elements that the combination lacks.

(B) A reply traversing the rejection by relying on an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 that antedates the Jones reference.

(C) A reply traversing the rejection by relying on an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132 containing evidence of criticality or unexpected results.

(D) A reply traversing the rejection by stating that the invention of widget Y and the Jones patent were commonly owned by ABC Company at the time of the invention of widget Y, and therefore, Jones is disqualified as a reference via 35 U.S.C. § 103(c).

(E) A reply traversing the rejection by perfecting a claim of priority to Clark's German application, filed March 21, 1999, disclosing widget Y under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d).

8. The model answer: The correct answer is (D). The prior art exception in 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) only applies to references that are only prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), (f), or (g). In this situation, the Jones patent qualifies as prior art under § 102(a) because it was issued prior to the filing of the Clark application. See MPEP § 706.02(I)(3). ~~Also, evidence of common ownership must be, but has not been, presented. Mere argument or a statement alleging common ownership does not suffice to establish common ownership.~~ Answer (A) is a proper reply in that it addresses the examiner's rejection by specifically pointing out why the examiner failed to make a prima facie showing of obviousness. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111. Answer (B) is a proper reply. See MPEP § 715. Answer (C) is a proper reply. See MPEP § 716. Answer (E) is a proper reply because perfecting a claim of priority to an earlier filed German application disqualifies the Jones reference as prior art.

Petitioner argues that answer (B) is correct. Petitioner contends that selection (B) would not be in accordance with USPTO practices if ABC did not invent Y prior to 1/24/2000 or submit a patent application in Germany prior to 4/3/99.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that selection (B) would not be in accordance with USPTO practices if ABC did not invent Y prior to 1/24/2000 or submit a patent application in Germany prior to 4/3/99, there is nothing in the fact pattern to suggest these assumptions. The instruction indicate that no additional facts should be assumed. Given that the practitioner otherwise comports with USPTO practice, selection (B) is in accord. Petitioner is assuming additional facts necessary to result in some noncompliance outside the scope of the facts as given. One can always find facts to assume to negate compliance, and this is not the intent of the test as indicated in the directions. As to petitioner's contention that model answer (D) is wrong because is in compliance, petitioner does not address the fact that model answer (D) refers to art that qualifies under 35 USC 102(a), taking it out of the context for 35 USC 103(c). In view of the facts as presented, selection (B) is in accordance with USPTO practices. Accordingly, model answer (D) is correct and petitioner's answer (B) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Morning question 15 reads as follows:

15. Able is a registered solo practitioner. Ben asks Able to prepare and prosecute an application for a utility patent. As part of the application, Able prepares a declaration and power of attorney, which Ben reviews and signs. Able files the application, the declaration, and power of attorney with the USPTO. Able quickly recognizes that help is necessary and contacts another registered practitioner, Chris, who often assists Able in such instances. Able, with Ben's consent, sends a proper associate power of attorney to the Office for Ben's application and directs that correspondence be sent to Chris. The examiner in the application takes up the application in the regular course of examination and sends out a rejection in an Office action. Chris sends a copy of the action to Ben to obtain Ben's comments on a proposed response. Unfortunately, after the first Office action, Able becomes terminally ill and dies. Ben does not know what to do, so Ben calls the examiner at the number on the Office action and explains that A died and Ben is worried how to proceed. Which of the following statement(s) is/are true?

(A) Chris should inform Ben that the Office will not correspond with both the registered representative and the applicant and therefore, Ben should not have any further contact with the Office and let Chris send in a proper response.

(B) Ben should send in a new power of attorney for anyone Ben intends to represent him before the Office.

(C) Ben should execute and sent to the USPTO a new power of attorney for any registered patent practitioner that Ben intends to have represent him before the Office.

(D) (B) and (C).

(E) None of the above.

15. The model answer: (C). MPEP § 406. Answer (C) is a true statement because the Ben may appoint a registered practitioner to represent him. Answer (A) is incorrect because the power of a principal attorney will be revoked or terminated by his or her death. Such a revocation or termination of the power of the principal attorney will also terminate the power of those appointed by the principal attorney. Therefore, Chris's associate power of attorney is revoked and Chris cannot continue representing Ben without a new power of attorney from Ben. Furthermore, the Office will send correspondence to both Chris and Ben in the event of notification of Able's death. (B) is not the best answer because it suggests Ben may appoint a non-practitioner to prosecute the application and because it does not require the power of attorney to be executed (*cf.* answer (C)). (D) is not the best answer because it includes (B). (E) is false because (C) is true.

Petitioner argues that answer (D) is correct. Petitioner contends that (B) is also true making (D) the best answer because the attorney in (B) is a registered practitioner or may be granted limited recognition under 37 CFR 10.9(a).

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that (B) is also true making (D) the best answer because the attorney in (B) is a registered practitioner or may be granted limited recognition under 37 CFR 10.9(a), selection (B) neither indicates that anyone Ben intends to represent him is a registered practitioner nor that limited recognition under 37 CFR 10.9(a) is sought. Ben cannot send in a new power of attorney for anyone – only for one who is a registered practitioner, or who is granted limited recognition. Accordingly, selection (B) is wrong, model answer (C) is correct and petitioner's answer (D) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Morning question 24 reads as follows:

24. Mr. Brick, the inventor, files an application with the USPTO on January 2, 2001 containing a single claim for his invention: a new bouncing ball called "Y". Brick receives a first Office action dated June 4, 2001 from the primary examiner handling Brick's application. The examiner rejected Brick's claim only under 35 U.S.C. § 103 on the grounds that Reference X teaches a bouncing ball called "Q," and that although "Y" and "Q" are not the same, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to make

changes to the “Q” ball in order to obtain a ball just like Brick’s “Y” ball. On August 2, 2001, Brick responds by stating that his new “Y” ball bounces unexpectedly higher than the “Q” ball described in Reference X. Brick includes a declaration, signed by Mrs. Kane, that includes extensive data comparing the bouncing results for the “Y” and “Q” balls and showing that the “Y” ball bounces unexpectedly higher than the “Q” ball. Brick argues that the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be withdrawn because he has proven that, in view of the unexpectedly higher bounce of the “Y” ball as compared to the “Q” ball, it would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to make changes to the “Q” ball to obtain Brick’s “Y” ball. On October 2, 2001, Brick receives a final rejection from the examiner. The rejection states, in its entirety: “The response has been reviewed but has not been found persuasive as to error in the rejection. The claim is finally rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons given in the first Office action.” Brick believes he is entitled to a patent to his new bouncing ball “Y.” How should Brick proceed?

- (A) Brick should give up because the declaration did not persuade the examiner of the merits of Brick’s invention.
- (B) Brick should timely file a Request for Reconsideration asking the examiner to reconsider the rejection on the basis of the Kane declaration and, as a precaution against the Request for Reconsideration being unsuccessful, also timely file a Notice of Appeal.
- (C) Brick should respond by submitting a request for reconsideration presenting an argument that Reference X does not provide an enabling disclosure for a new ball with the unexpectedly higher bounce of his “Y” ball.
- (D) Brick should respond by submitting a request for reconsideration presenting an argument that Reference X does not provide a written description for a new ball with the unexpectedly higher bounce of his “Y” ball.
- (E) Brick should respond by submitting a request for reconsideration presenting an argument the declaration data proves that the “Q” ball and the “Y” are not identical.

24. The model answer: (B) is the correct answer. It is inappropriate and injudicious to disregard any admissible evidence in any judicial proceeding. *Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.*, 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The examiner has not analyzed the data in the declaration nor provided an explanation as to why the declaration did not overcome the rejection. Furthermore, the rejection has not been reviewed anew in light of the declaration. The examiner should have reweighed the entire merits of the *prima facie* case of obviousness in light of the data. *In re Hedges*, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Brick should ask that the rejection be reconsidered and file a Notice of Appeal to safeguard his interest for a review of the rejection by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences if the rejection is not reconsidered. 37 C.F.R. § 1.116. (A) is wrong because there is no evidence that the examiner made any review of the declaration. (C) is wrong because whether or not Reference X provides an enabling disclosure for Brick’s invention is immaterial to the

question of obviousness. If there were to be a question of enabling disclosure for Reference X, it would be with respect to the “Q” ball relied upon by the examiner, not applicant’s “Y” ball. (D) is wrong because whether or not Reference X provides a written description for Brick’s invention is immaterial to the question of obviousness raised by the examiner. (E) is wrong because the issue is one of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, not identity under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Given that the examiner has rejected the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and not under § 102, the examiner has already conceded that the “Q” and “Y” balls are not the same.

Petitioner argues that answer (E) is also correct. Petitioner contends that (B) and (E) are equivalent because Brick may lack funds or motivation for an appeal.

Petitioner’s arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner’s statement that (B) and (E) are equivalent because Brick may lack funds or motivation for an appeal, there are no facts in the questions that suggest that Brick may lack funds or not be motivated to appeal. On the contrary, the facts explicitly state that Brick believes he is entitled to a patent, suggesting motivation to appeal if necessary. Given the facts presented, Brick should also file a notice of appeal. More to the point, Petitioner has failed to argue why the model answer reason for (E)’s incorrectness is wrong due to Brick’s inappropriate argument of identity of balls, which is applicable to a 35 USC 102, but not a 35 USC 103, rejection, as rendered by the examiner. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, (B) and (E) are not equivalent. Accordingly, model answer (B) is correct and petitioner’s answer (E) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner’s request for credit on this question is denied.

Morning question 32 reads as follows:

32. Johnnie owns a supermarket store in Cleveland, Ohio, and is constantly frustrated when little children drop their chewing gum on Johnnie’s clean floor in the supermarket. In her spare time, Johnnie develops an entirely novel type of coating material that she applies to floor tile. The coating material resists adhesion to chewing gum. In order to check out the effectiveness of the floor tile coating material, on December 31, 2000, she secretly covers the floor tiles in her supermarket with the new chewing gum resistant floor tile coating material. Johnnie is amazed at the results inasmuch as cleaning the floor was never easier. On January 30, 2001, Johnnie, satisfied with the experimental use results, ceased testing the use of the coating material. The ability of the coating material to withstand chewing gum adhesion continued unabated throughout the remainder of 2001. On January 1, 2002, one of Johnnie’s many customers, James, remarked at how clean the floor looked. Johnnie then told James of her invention. James thinks for one moment and suggests that the floor tile coating material may be useful in microwave ovens, so that food will not stick to the interior sides of the microwave oven. James discusses getting patent protection with Johnnie. Which of the following is true?

- (A) Johnnie could never be entitled to a patent on a floor tile in combination with a coating material affixed to the outer surface of the tile.
- (B) James can be named as a co-inventor with Johnnie in a patent application claiming a microwave oven wherein the internal surfaces of the oven are coated with the coating material.
- (C) Since for one year Johnnie told nobody that the floor tile in her supermarket contained the new chewing gum resistant coating material, she would never be barred from obtaining patent protection for the floor coating material.
- (D) Use of the floor tile coating material in microwave ovens would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, since James thought of it within seconds after first learning of the floor tile coating material, and James was not skilled in the art.
- (E) The floor tile having the coating material affixed to the outer surface of the tile, an article of manufacture, would not be patentable as of January 1, 2002 inasmuch as the article was in public use on the supermarket floor for one year.

32. The model answer: (B). Since Johnnie developed the material and James thought of the idea to use it in microwave ovens, they rightfully could be considered co-inventors of the new article of manufacture. As to (A) and (C), public use began on when the experimental use ended on January 30, 2001, and occurs even when the public is unaware that they were walking on the developed material since the material was used in a public place. As to (D), even though James only took a second to think of the idea, he is entitled to receive a patent unless it was obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Nothing in the prior art revealed that it was obvious to use the material in microwave ovens. As to (E), the article of manufacture is not barred even though the floor material itself cannot be patented. Johnnie conducted an experimental use of the article from December 31, 2000 through January 30, 2001. Thereafter, Johnnie had one year from the end date of the experimental use to file a patent application for the article. Johnnie may file a patent application before January 30, 2002.

Petitioner argues that answer (A) is also correct. Petitioner contends that the lack of a date of reference in the question leads a reasonable person to believe that the product has been in use for more than a year.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that the lack of a date of reference in the question leads a reasonable person to believe that the product has been in use for more than a year, public use began on when the experimental use ended on January 30, 2001, and occurs even when the public is unaware that they were walking on the developed material since the material was used in a public place. More to the point, (A) says that Johnnie could never be entitled – which cannot be true – there is some time window in which Johnnie is

entitled, irrespective of whether that window is in the future or past relative to the time Johnnie is making her decision. Accordingly, model answer (B) is correct and petitioner's answer (A) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Afternoon question 12 reads as follows:

12. An applicant's claim stands rejected as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Lance in view of Barry. Lance and Barry are patents that issued and were published more than one year before applicant's effective filing date. Which of the following arguments could properly overcome the rejection?

(A) Barry's device is too large to combine with Lance's device.

(B) The Barry reference is nonanalogous art, because, although pertinent to the particular problem with which Lance was concerned, it relates to a different field of endeavor than the applicant's invention.

(C) The combination of Lance and Barry would have precluded Lance's device from performing as Lance intended.

(D) The Barry reference does not show all of the claimed elements arranged in the same manner as the elements are set forth in the claim.

(E) All of the above.

12. The model answer: (C) is correct. "If proposed modification would render the prior art invention being modified unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, then there is no suggestion or motivation to make the proposed modification." MPEP § 2143.01 (citing *In re Gordon*, 733 F.2d 900, 221 USPQ 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Here, the combination would render Lance's device unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. (A) is incorrect. "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." MPEP § 2145, paragraph III (quoting *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981)). Here, the argument fails to address what the combined teachings of the references would or would not have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. (B) is incorrect. "In order to rely on a reference as a basis for rejection of the applicant's invention, the reference must either be in the field of the applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was concerned." MPEP § 2141.01(a) (quoting *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Here, Barry's art could still be analogous if it was reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the

applicant was concerned. (D) is incorrect. The argument addresses a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102, as opposed to the rejection that was made, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which raises obviousness, not anticipation, issues. (E) is not correct because (A), (B) and (D) are incorrect.

Petitioner argues that answer (E) is also correct. Petitioner contends that (A), (B) and (D) are correct making (E) the best answer. Petitioner contends (A) is correct because size may be sufficient to overcome the rejection. Petitioner contends (B) is correct because there is no indication that the references are reasonably pertinent. Petitioner contends (D) is correct because the question does not ask to overcome a 35 USC 102(b) rejection.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that (A), (B) and (D) are correct making (E) the best answer, none of these alternatives are correct. As to (A), there is no suggestion in the fact pattern that size is sufficient to overcome the rejection. If the teaching would have suggested to one of ordinary skill the combination, then size would not be sufficient to overcome the rejection. As to (B), that selection explicitly states it is pertinent to the particular problem with which Lance was concerned. As to (D), whether the question asks relative to a 35 USC 103 or a 35 USC 102(b) rejection is not at issue, rather whether it is sufficient to overcome a 35 USC 103 rejection to argue that the Barry reference does not show all of the claimed elements arranged in the same manner as the elements are set forth in the claim. This is not sufficient because any claimed elements not found in Barry would be found in Lance, according to the rejection fact pattern. Accordingly, model answer (C) is correct and petitioner's answer (E) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Afternoon question 22 reads as follows:

22. Patentee, Iam Smarter, filed and prosecuted his own nonprovisional patent application on November 29, 1999, and received a patent for his novel cellular phone on June 5, 2001. He was very eager to market his invention and spent the summer meeting with potential licensees of his cellular phone patent. Throughout the summer of 2001, all of the potential licensees expressed concern that the claim coverage that Smarter obtained in his cellular phone patent was not broad enough to corner the market on this technology, and therefore indicated to him that they feel it was not lucrative enough to meet their financial aspirations. By the end of the summer, Smarter is discouraged. On September 5, 2001, Smarter consults with you to find out if there is anything he can do at this point to improve his ability to market his invention. At your consultation with Smarter, you learn the foregoing, and that in his original patent application, Smarter had a number of claims that were subjected to a restriction requirement, but were nonelected and withdrawn from further consideration. You also learn that Smarter has no currently pending application, that the specification discloses Smart's invention more broadly than he ever claimed, and that the claims, in fact, are narrower than the supporting disclosure in the specification.

Which of the following will be the best recommendation in accordance with proper USTPO practice and procedure?

- (A) Smarter should immediately file a divisional application under 37 CFR 1.53(b) including the nonelected claims that were subjected to a restriction requirement in the nonprovisional application that issued as the patent.
- (B) Smarter should file a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. § 251, including the nonelected claims that were subjected to the restriction requirement in the nonprovisional application that issued as the patent.
- (C) Smarter should file a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. § 251, broadening the scope of the claims of the issued patent, and then file a divisional reissue application presenting only the nonelected claims that were subjected to a restriction requirement in the nonprovisional application which issued as the patent.
- (D) Smarter should simultaneously file two separate reissue applications under 35 U.S.C. § 251, one including broadening amendments of the claims in the original patent, and one including the nonelected claims that were subjected to a restriction requirement in the nonprovisional application which issued as the patent.
- (E) Smarter should file a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. § 251 on or before June 5, 2003, broadening the scope of the claims of the issued patent.

22. The model answer: (E) is the correct answer. 35 U.S.C. § 251. The reissue permits Smarter to broaden the claimed subject. (A) is incorrect. There must be copendency between the divisional application and the original application. 35 U.S.C. § 120. (B) This is incorrect, as an applicant's failure to timely file a divisional application while the original application is still pending is not considered to be an error correctable via reissue, *In re Orita*, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280, 193 USPQ 145, 148 (CCPA 1977). (C) This is incorrect, as an applicant's failure to timely file a divisional application while the original application is still pending is not considered to be an error correctable via reissue, *Id.*, including a divisional reissue application. MPEP § 1402. (D) This is incorrect, as an applicant's failure to timely file a divisional application while the original application is still pending is not considered to be an error correctable via reissue, *Id.*

Petitioner argues that answer (A) is correct. Petitioner contends that the lack of copendency in answer (A) implies that Smarter requested the Director to reissue the application and file a divisional.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that the lack of copendency in answer (A) implies that Smarter requested the Director to reissue the application and file a divisional, there is no suggestion in the fact pattern that any such request was made. Instead, selection (A) indicates that the divisional is filed immediately, contradicting an intermediate reissue

application filing. Accordingly, model answer (E) is correct and petitioner's answer (A) is incorrect.


No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

ORDER

For the reasons given above, one point has been added to petitioner's score on the Examination. Therefore, petitioner's score is 69. This score is insufficient to pass the Examination.

Upon consideration of the request for regrade to the Director of the USPTO, it is ORDERED that the request for a passing grade on the Examination is denied.

This is a final agency action.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Spar", is positioned above a horizontal line.

Robert J. Spar
Director, Office of Patent Legal Administration
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
for Patent Examination Policy